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Intellectual property rights as revenue-generation for Galileo

TO OWN OR NOT TO OWN,
THAT IS THE QUESTION
By Dr Frans G. von der Dunk, director, Space Law Research International Institute of Air
and Space Law, The Netherlands, e-mail: f.g.vonderdunk@law.leidenuniv.nl

One of the major legal issues surrounding the future Galileo concerns intellectual property rights
and their potential for revenue-generation to the
benefit of the future private concessionaire.This article investigates some of the key aspects concerned, with a view also to down-stream valueadded service providers using Galileo signals and
services.
Introduction

Free access to signals provided by the US Global
Positioning System (GPS) and the Russian

GLONASS led to the introduction the mid-1990s
of Global Navigation Satellite Services (GNSS) in
the civil sector.This caused a major evolution in the
approach to various timing, positioning and navigation problems and needs, and stimulated a number
of very important technological, operational and
market developments. Whilst Europe profited to a
considerable extent from these developments, for
example through the European Geostationary
Navigation Overlay System (EGNOS), such benefits were indirect and small compared to benefits in
particular to the US economy. Moreover, the continuation of any such benefits remained totally de-

In 2008 or shortly thereafter Europe will have its own satellite navigation system: Galileo.
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pendent upon continuous provision of GPS and
GLONASS signals.
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From this situation the European Commission, representing the European Union (EU) and the European Space Agency (ESA), deduced a crucial need
for Europe to become directly involved in the development of a second-generation GNSS system. A
realisation of the further potential of GNSS in economic, as well as strategic terms, resulted in plans
for Galileo. At the present point in time the major
decisions at both government and European level
necessary for the development, deployment and
operation of Galileo have been taken, and by 2008
or shortly thereafter Europe will have its own operational satellite navigation system. Apart from essentially duplicating GPS in a number of areas and
hence providing some welcome redundancy, in
view of the inherent vulnerability of GPS, Galileo is
intended to provide a number of features not (yet)
found in the operation and use of
GPS. Some of these have distinct and
rather novel legal consequences,
such as the use of intellectual property rights, a matter of interest for
further investigation; hence the exclusive focus of this article upon
Galileo.

of the CS and the SOL. The CS will be provided
against direct user charges, offering in return enhanced data-streams and communication potential,
as well as service guarantees and some measure of
liability acceptance. The SOL will also somehow be
provided against user charges (although these will
probably be included in existing charges such as, in
the case of aviation, ATC charges) and be accompanied by liability arrangements. These services will in
particular provide the level of integrity and integrity
monitoring which GPS cannot offer. It is precisely for
these reasons that augmentation systems like
EGNOS have been developed, themselves adding
such benefits to the use of GPS. Finally, contribution
to existing SAR services also represents something
not currently provided by GPS.
A second major differentiating factor for Galileo is
its planned complicated institutional structure, involving civil authorities at the highest level. This is

Towards Galileo

A primary crucial manner in which
Galileo will distinguish itself from
GPS (and GLONASS) concerns the
services to be provided. Whilst the
details of these are yet to be determined, the intention is for Galileo to
provide five core services as follows:
- the Open Service (OS)
- the Commercial Services (CS)
- the Safety-Of-Life Services (SOL)
- the Public Regulated Services
(PRS)
- a contribution to existing SearchAnd-Rescue Services (SAR).
Sending out timing, positioning and navigation signals, a Galileo satellite will contain many highly

The OS will be comparable to (and
valuable high-technology features - protection of the intellectual property rights over such features is,
however, a major issue.
interoperable with) the GPS Standard
Positioning Signal (SPS); it will provide
perhaps slightly enhanced signals,
without user charges, and without any
attendant liability or service guarantees.The PRS will clearly distinct from both GPS and GLONASS,
be roughly comparable to the GPS Precise Position- where national military authorities own and opering Signal (PPS), in particular as it will be encrypted ate the system and civil users are able (only) to adand available only to a limited and closed group of dress their interests and worries through consultausers; in the case of PPS only the US military and al- tion procedures, having themselves no say over the
lies, in the case of the PRS the governments of ESA operation of the systems.
member states and, more generally, the EU.
At the core of the institutional structure envisaged
The main differentiation between Galileo and GPS in for Galileo, a Public-Private Partnership (PPP) will be
this regard will consequently consist in the provision established; the European Commission in particular
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was keen to involve not only public but also private
investments in operation and marketing of the system. Obviously any such fundamental private involvement also demands concurrent responsibilities
and competencies, and these will be laid down in a
negotiated concession agreement. For this purpose
in 2003 the European Commission and ESA together established the Galileo Joint Undertaking (GJU)
on their behalf to conduct the tendering process
and decide on a winning private consortium [1].
Such a private consortium, currently being labelled
as a ‘Galileo Operating Company’ (GOC), will operate the system, market and sell the (paid) services and develop new markets. The GALILEI Study
performed for the Commission put forward the following reasons for having a private operator as another key differentiator with regard to the current
GPS [2]:
- for flexible, non-bureaucratic and commercial
modes of operation
- for marketing purposes
- for obtaining finance and investment from capital
markets in normal commercial modes
- for dealing with intellectual property-rights issues
in a proper and more commercially-oriented
fashion
- for obtaining insurance against limited liability
- for sensible business partnership.
Representing the other side of the PPP, a public
body currently going by the moniker of Galileo Supervisory Authority (GSA) will own the system,
monitor GOC operation thereof and deal with various public, international, safety and security-related
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interests. In the GALILEI Study a number of reasons
were put forward for having a public supervisory
body in such a core position within the institutional architecture [3]:
- to negotiate and conclude agreements with
states ‘external’ to Galileo yet hosting Galileo-related assets/service providers
- to license non-European augmentation and integrity providers (or negotiating and concluding
agreements on such operations by the GOC)
- to serve the general public interest, for example
in regard of safety, security and search-and-rescue
issues
- to offer last-resort unlimited liability to valueadded service providers and end-users.
At the time of writing, the allocation process for
concession to operate the system has narrowed
down the competition to two remaining consortia:
Eurely and iNavSat. The former comprises at the
highest level Alcatel, Finmeccanica, Hispasat, AENA,
Boeing, the Russian Federal Space Agency,
Deutsche Bank, Chinasat and Navteq; the latter
consortium comprises EADS Space, ING Bank, Inmarsat Ventures, the Thales Group, Boeing and the
Russian Federal Space Agency. Later in 2005 the
winner is to be decided, and by the end of 2005 or
shortly thereafter further detailed negotiations on
the concession should lead to a finalised concession
agreement, probably covering a period of twenty
years. Details of the concession will thus become
clear only at that point and then, of course, only to
the extent that they do not remain confidential for
security and/or commercial reasons.

Using Galileo services for car navigation might be very interesting....
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For any concessionaire this obviously raises the
question of the commercial rationale behind providing a service free of charge which will, in all likelihood, cost at least something to provide. One solution would of course be to ‘cross-subsidise’: to
ensure that sufficient revenues are generated by
other, paid services to pay for any costs specifically
attached to provision of the OS. A second solution
would be simple public subsidy (whether from EU
funds or otherwise) to offset any such costs. However, the solution envisaged by the Commission in
particular is that the GOC generate OS-related
revenue somehow through the mechanism of intellectual property rights. In view of the major role
of the Commission within the GJU, the latter will
probably press during concession negotiations with
the winning consortium
for use of this mechanism.
The use of intellectual property rights as a revenuegenerating tool, however, poses a number of important questions, including some with substantial
associated legal elements.This article presents a first

inventory of these legal issues, always keeping in
mind that in the end it will be for the two negotiators on the concession to agree on the details of
using such mechanisms for revenue generation within the bounds, of course, of the law as it stands.
Secondly, then, such an outcome will fundamentally
determine parameters for any down-stream usage
of Galileo signals and services, read with regard to
value-added service providers contracting with the
GOC for such signals and services.
Intellectual Property Rights: a General
Overview

It has to be understood that property rights, in the
broadest sense of the phrase, are about giving private persons and entities the opportunity to ‘own’
something and protect such ownership by law. Based
on the same underlying philosophy, it has long been
considered essential for society too to protect nonphysical assets by means of so-called intellectual
property rights. Generally, such non-physical property rights have been classified into two broad and
generic categories: industrial property rights and intellectual property rights in a narrower sense. All
these regimes essentially provide for a balance between the interests of the individual whose industrial or intellectual property is at stake, and the interests of society at large in being able ultimately also
to benefit from such property.This balance is further
influenced by policy considerations regarding the encouragement of public education and enlightenment,
assistance in economic development and the protection of national security, all of which have a bear-

...but what will the user have to pay for any intellectual property rights incorporated in the on-board device?
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However, already at this stage and without knowing
any such details in advance one major issue that
merits attention, including legal attention, concerns
the potential of intellectual property rights as a revenue-generating tool for Galileo, in particular for
the GOC.The two main initiators of Galileo development, the European Commission and the European Space Agency, are both adamant that the future concessionaire will inter alia provide the
aforementioned OS for free.
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ing on the actual level of intellectual property rights
protection in given cases.
The category of intellectual property rights stricto
sensu concerns, most prominently, copyright and
such additional neighbouring rights as those related
to production, editing and publishing, photographs,
computer programs and databases. The essence of
copyright is that protection of the content of a certain piece of work – which may well include the content of any timing, positioning or navigation message!
– stimulates people to undertake the effort of creating a piece of work in the first place; they may be
sure that (at least, in law,) free-riding is disallowed,
since creators have an exclusive right to their own
work. Of course, they can then also use this right as
a revenue-generating tool by allowing others, against
a fee, to use copyrighted work.
Copyright is, at the same time, only a rather limited form of property right providing basic opposition to mutilation of a piece of creative work and
determining proper forms of publication, alteration
or additions. In other words, all that it disallows is
reproduction without proper reference, or reproduction of major parts of a copyrighted work.
Copyright thus encompasses certain enumerated
rights which are statutorily reserved to the copyright holder, such as the right to reproduce the
work in copies, to prepare derivative works based
on the original work and to distribute copies to the
public for exploitation of the product. Copyright
does thus establish a complicated balance between
the private interest of the creator and the public interest of society at large.
With regard specifically to timing, positioning and
navigation services, one further issue has to be
noted: the specifics of digital and/or electronic messages and the current IT-environment raise specific
questions as to the appropriateness of general copyrights (developed in the past for written works,
paintings and pictures, music etcetera) for this sector.
In particular, the problems of enforcing copyright:
monitoring all use, uncovering unauthorised use and
sanction against such, raise fundamental questions
about the practical relevance of copyright in a digital
and electronic environment. But, of course, these
problems are not unique to the timing, positioning
and navigation sectors. As similar experiences in
other digital and electronic environments (computer
software, the internet) have shown, such measures at
least ensure the eventual detection of any massive
unauthorised use, and appropriate sanctions, given
that a proper legal regime is in place. Also, the mere
fact that certain forms of use are clearly prohibited
may at least considerably diminish the chances of
such unauthorised use in the first place.
With a view to the timing, positioning and navigation environment within which Galileo is to oper-
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ate, two approaches must be noted which may,
broadly speaking, be discerned regarding copyrights.
The European-continental approach is relatively
speaking more author-minded; the author has a
right to the fruits of his labour, which has its primary
roots in the natural bond between author and the
work he has created. At the same time, in general,
European-continental copyright laws are alike in requiring a certain level of originality; this may be considered the threshold to enjoyment of copyright
protection, in particular in cases of digital and/or
electronic services. The Anglo-American approach,
on the other hand, is more utilitarian: copyright is
aimed at stimulating authors essentially for the purpose of allowing society to benefit from them, and
dealing with them accordingly, so the level of protection is relatively low. At the same time, under
Anglo-Saxon intellectual property rights law it basically suffices that skill and labour are involved; the
‘sweat of the brow’ concept largely replaces a requirement of authorial creativity being perceptible
in the work.
The other category of industrial property rights operates essentially in similar fashion to establish a balance between the interests of society in stimulating
individual creativity for the benefit of society and
the interests of that individual in personally reaping
the benefits of his creativity; but it is targeted at
protecting the expression of creativity in a more ‘industrial’ context. This concerns patents for inventions as the most prominent category, but also includes trademarks, service marks and suchlike.
Ownership of a patent entitles the owner to quite
exclusive control over the invention thus patented
for many years to come (usually something like
twenty) depending, of course, upon a sufficiency of
‘novelty’ and practicality for something to be considered an invention.The essence of patent, basically similar to that of copyright, is to stimulate inventiveness and inventions by offering the prospective
inventor certain exclusive rights over his invention
and some financial benefits, since his exclusive rights
allow him to license others to use the patented invention against the payments of royalties. It is thus
that patent ownership translates into a revenuegenerating mechanism for the patent holder.
An altogether different question in the case of
patents, of course, concerns the extent to which
any legal protection afforded by intellectual property right in cases of timing, positioning or navigation-related inventions also implies de facto protection. Unauthorised use of patents may not actually
be discovered, relevant national legal regimes might
turn out not to allow for a claim to be made (in
the case of Galileo, such disputes may be imagined
arising all over the world, and many countries lack
the appropriate legal regimes or court procedures)
and the chances of a claim being successful may be
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Further to such general discussions surrounding the
potential applicability of patents in the timing, positioning and navigation-environment, broadly speaking two approaches are taken to patentability, best
summarised respectively as ‘first-to-invent’ and ‘firstto-file’ (with a recognised, usually governmental,
patent authority). The first system is generally adhered to by European countries, whereas the second is inter alia applicable in the US.
Intellectual Property Rights and the Law:
National, International and European

It has to be realised that all sorts of intellectual
property rights have historically been addressed, first
of all at national level. For centuries occasional domestic legislation has been evolved to try to ensure
a balance between the individual interest of the creator or inventor and the general interests of society in such creations and inventions. Obviously, the
scope of such legislation has extended no farther
than the territory of the state concerned when it
came to enforcement of applicable rules on protection. As far as patent is concerned, the enjoyment
of protection also depends initially upon territoriality: the national law of the territory wherein an invention is made and filed, respectively, applies (although usually patent authorities allow only filing of
inventions made on their own territory).
But ever since the beginning, awareness of international trade and commerce and the obvious interest in ensuring widespread additional protection
outside national borders, as well as maximising harmony between relevant national regimes has led to
international efforts in this direction.Thus regarding
copyright, for example, the 1886 Berne Convention
for the protection of literary and artistic works established a first measure of cross-border recognition of nationally-granted copyrights, and harmonisation of the relevant national laws [4]. Similarly, in
the field of patent protection [5] the 1883 Convention for the Protection of Industrial Property as
Modified by Additional Act of 14th December 1900
and Final Protocol was agreed.Whilst these treaties
have been regularly updated in terms of content
and scope and have enjoyed increasing adherence,
none enjoys full global membership [6]. So in each
particular case of a (national) market targeted by
Galileo and the GOC we may be forced to inves-
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tigate whether the state concerned has developed
any national legal/enforcement regime and/or
whether international rules laid down in certain
treaties are actually applicable within that jurisdiction.
Finally, in particular when it comes to Galileo as a
European system no doubt first targeting EU markets, it is noteworthy that harmonisation and mutual recognition have been realised to an even
greater extent within the context of the European
Union. Because of the inherent economic value of
intellectual property rights and the ensuing possibility of their use or abuse for competition purposes, proper regulation of intellectual property rights
also came to be considered an indispensable part
of the European Internal Market. A number of specific European legal agreements have therefore led
to the basic existence among EU member states
(certainly the ‘old’ fifteen; to what extent the ten
newly acceded member states are already incorporated into this regime without a transition period is
another matter) of one, comprehensively applicable
and harmonised regime on intellectual property
rights [7].
Intellectual Property Rights in the Context
of Galileo and GOC Commercial Operations

Now that the major thrust of legal protection of intellectual property rights has been outlined here, it
becomes possible to at least make an inventory of
‘how these would work’ in the context of Galileo,
with a view to their potential as a revenue-generating mechanism for the GOC.
A great deal of attention was paid to this aspect of
Galileo’s future operations in the context of the
GALILEI Study Cluster [8]. Firstly, this analysis resulted in an overview of the types of intellectual
property rights which might apply to Galileo. Secondly, their possible effectiveness in the case of
Galileo was analysed.Thirdly, an analysis of their respective revenue-generating potential was provided. Unfortunately, it is beyond the scope of this article to go into all the details of these analyses; the
conclusions, however, merit revisiting.
The main conclusion pertained to the potential
economic significance of intellectual property rights.
From this perspective, copyright on semiconductor
topography as mentioned as a revenue generator
of potential interest has, as far as is known, never
been used as such a tool and would also be an unlikely candidate within the context of Galileo. Copyright on software seemed useful only in the software publishing industry and, since it is anyway
widely and easily pirated, would not seem either to
offer interesting possibilities. Semiconductor topography and software copyright have a very narrow
scope, covering only a single embodiment; alterna-
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rather slim. Whilst these are extremely relevant issues, both in the decision to patent a certain timing, positioning or navigation-related device and in
subsequent enforcement of such a patent, they lie
beyond the scope of this paper. The most that can
be said here is, again, that at least massive piracy will
sooner or later be detected, and that the mere fact
of a patent will restrain at least some potential pirates from going ahead with intended unauthorised
use.

POLICY & STRATEGY

EUROPEAN JOURNAL

tives are consequently easy to imagine, and an only
minor change in a copyrighted item would cause it
to fall outside the scope of protection. Both are difficult to detect in the finished product, so enforcement against infringement is equally difficult. Finally,
both have a short time to obsolescence, which in
the case of Galileo might actually about equal the
time to market.
Trademark protection would, then, seem to present
a more promising option. As the name Galileo is already widely filed, however, its ultimate economic
potential would depend mostly upon marketing influence on end-user psychology, through advertising
for example. At the same time, its effectiveness
would depend on the extent to which other ownership and/or usage of a ‘Galileo’ trademark could
legally be minimised so as to pave the way for this
Galileo.
From a factual perspective, the protection of trade
secrets, know-how and encryption may be the only
form of protection which could eventually be applied
to every terminal in the world. This, however, is not
properly speaking a legal matter; ultimately it depends more upon the factual possibilities of creating
optimally impenetrable barriers, and to the extent
that such barriers might then (illegally, that is, basically without authorisation) be overcome; generally
speaking, normal criminal jurisdiction would apply.
Most importantly, with the exception perhaps of encryption, these forms of protection do not easily
lend themselves to generating income; as defence
mechanisms they are rather absolute in character.
When it comes to legal protection, therefore,
patent protection, especially if standardised and if
alternative solutions are not to be standard-compliant, would seem to provide the most interesting
mechanism. Actually, this form of protection could
cover the majority of the world market. Protection
exists only in states where the patent is filed, which
means that over 140 states are available for this
purpose through the 1970 Patent Co-operation
Treaty filing procedure [9]. Additional regional filing
procedures are available within Europe, Eurasia,
Africa and the Asia-Pacific region, excluding Japan
and China. A European Community Patent [10] is
on the horizon, essentially a unified patent with EUwide effect. The duration of revenue-bearing protection is twenty years from filing, or until someone
else finds a viable, non-infringing alternative whichever comes first. Finally, the difficulties in circumventing patents are considered substantial, although in the case of down-stream services and applications and patentable items used in this
environment evaluation may have to be reconsidered. This is particularly true in view of the practical need to balance the costs of enforcement actions against chances of their success, and the
chances and costs of unsanctioned piracy.
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Further, since any revenue-generating potential for
the GOC depends upon the extent to which it
owns a patent, any patent should be made to rest
upon the Signal-In-Space (SIS) and in particular on
its signal waveforms and encryption algorithms, as
these are under control of the GOC. Moreover, the
highest probabilities for innovation lie within the
space segment or in the SIS itself. Actors most likely to generate intellectual property rights with the
greatest chance of patentability are those working
at system architect-level, air interface, signal specification and characteristics, which is where the GOC
is indeed to operate.
At the same time the highest potential for revenues
lies in the user segment, where innovation is expected to be low to non-existent. To reconcile
these apparently disparate considerations spaceborne intellectual property must be ‘brought down
to earth’, that is: it must somehow be embodied in
the user terminals, possibly accomplished by a
patent on the signal, provided that the signal characteristics also impose specific characteristics on
the receivers.
However, this will require a few more issues to be
solved. So far both ESA and the European Commission have been used to issuing contracts to the
space industry whilst themselves maintaining very
strong rights over any resulting patents or inventions because of the large amounts of public money
(to be) invested. If, however, a GOC is to be enticed under the concession to put a lot of effort
(read ‘a lot of money’) into developing patentable
inventions, it is crucial that somehow ownership of
patents thus developed come to be owned or at
least sufficiently controlled by the GOC to allow it
indeed to use applicable patents for the purpose of
revenue generation. Otherwise, researchers under
Galileo-related research contracts might find their
enthusiasm for developing items of interest and eligible for patent or copyright fundamentally stifled.
Any limitations resulting from such ESA and/or EU
policies on the capability of the GOC itself to control its intellectual property will most likely also
have a bearing on the down-stream development
of items eligible for patent or copyright. Such consequences are, however, by no means straightforward to forecast. It may indeed mean that the
GOC adopt the same approach (or is even forced
to do so) towards down-stream development by
its customers of items somehow involving Galileo
signals, services or hardware. But it may also mean
easy access for GOC down-stream customers to
relevant intellectual property; and to the extent
that ESA or the Commission actually brings this
into the public domain, it might perhaps even be for
free. This does not, as such, exclude the possibility
for such customers to patent, copyright or otherwise protect their own relevant items developed
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using Galileo signals, services or hardware. Still
more scenarios might have to be considered before a more or less definitive evaluation can be offered.

Another issue concerns the applicability of patent
protection as it depends upon the novelty of relevant assets to be patented. Thus any invention
should be ‘non-obvious’, in particular as compared
with GPS; for patent rights to work, therefore, a
major duty rests upon the engineers to ensure that
sufficient novelty does indeed inform Galileo SISgeneration.Then, as the GOC is unlikely itself to develop signal waveforms or encryption algorithms, it

Finally, it has to be pointed out once more that the
real value of intellectual property rights depends
not only on the applicability and application of relevant legal regimes to protect them, but also on

Agriculture: one of many potential down-stream value-added applications of Galileo services.

should ensure through contracts with manufacturers or other providers that the applicable patents
come to rest with itself rather than with the creators of the patented asset.
The establishment of a patent pool for essential intellectual property rights offers a particularly interesting, partly alternative, tool for overcoming this
problem. The essence of the ‘patent pool’ concept
is that should there emerge several holders of essential intellectual property rights, one being the future concessionaire and others developing relevant
patents elsewhere in the chain of production for
key Galileo products, some or all of these patents
be pooled for eventual joint collection and distribution of royalties benefiting all pool members.
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the practical reality of what it costs to actually use
the law to protect them as set against the costs of
and revenues lost by not protecting them. Patents
may be used for the protection of investments, by
down-stream Galileo customers for their own inventions as much as by the GOC for up-stream
Galileo-related inventions. Similarly, copyrights may
be used for the protection of content, by downstream Galileo customers for the content of their
own timing, positioning and navigation-related
messages as much as by the GOC for up-stream
Galileo-related such messages. In both cases, however, only a pragmatic business decision will decide
whether and/or how to use those legal instruments made available by intellectual property
rights law.
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Ultimately, however, all depends here on the outcome
of many yet to be conducted negotiations; firstly between concessionaire-to-be and the GJU, and secondly individual contract negotiations between concessionaire and its customers, where the GJU will no
doubt wish to flow down relevant aspects of the concession agreement to those customers.

It is along these lines that the (future) GOC, that
is the consortium winning the concession, might
be expected to develop its intellectual property
rights strategy in close co-operation with, or indeed with the support of, the (future) GSA. Following on from this, intellectual property thus protected will be used to generate revenues from
GOC clients and down-stream customers, who
will be faced with the basic choice of paying for
such intellectual property rights in order to have
access to the relevant Galileo services, or using
non-Galileo options to fulfil their own business requirements in such cases as their being not individuals interested in using Galileo for their own
sake, but rather services and applications businesses interested in integrating Galileo services
into their own services or applications.
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It may be noted that whilst hardware (if inventive)
and content (if creative, or at least having cost
‘sweat-of-the-brow’) may indeed make use of, respectively, patent and copyright for protection purposes, as yet the services themselves (as distinct
from the hardware involved or the content delivered) do not fit within this outline. Here, however,
it should be noted that the GOC will have a monopoly on Galileo services as (exclusive) concessionaire at the level of the Galileo system itself and,
until and unless a competing system arrives on the
scene providing the same levels and types of services, a monopoly on these too. In the process of
contracting with down-stream service and application providers, such a de facto monopoly could be
used to ensure that Galileo customers somehow
protect their services from being copied by, for example, exclusive use of the service contracted for
within a certain area, for certain purposes or under
certain circumstances.
Whilst such an approach might be contrary to the
general competition-minded and free-and-fairtrade-oriented approach of the European Union
and the Commission, it may be necessary in order
to create sufficient interests on the value-added
service providers front to create enough of a business-case for Galileo – which is clearly the main
concern of the Commission today. In other words,
work should be done to make use of the possibilities for exemptions and exceptions to application
of the Internal Market and competition-regimes
also offered within the framework of European
Community law.
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Will manufacturers be sufficiently stimulated to put
up large sums of money to generate novel and
hence patentable elements of the space hardware,
software or signals? Will the two international entities initiating and supervising Galileo be able and
willing meanwhile – and time is running out if the
deadline of the end of 2005 for concession finalisation is to be met – to set up a coherent and farsighted intellectual property rights policy? In short,
to what extent will the private concessionaire own
the key assets for revenue generation, as far as the
tool of intellectual property rights is concerned?
For any down-stream potential customers of the
GOC and Galileo-provided timing, positioning and
navigation signals and services this then will be the
framework within which they in turn have to negotiate contracts on such usage. It would be wise
for any such customer to prepare for negotiations
by clearly determining its own potential for developing items eligible for patent, copyright or other
protection, as well as a ‘business case’ for using any
of the available intellectual property rights protection instruments discussed above (as compared to
not using them), whilst realising that to a large extent the terms of such a contract will be presented as a given. On the other hand, nothing obliges a
customer to abide by contractual terms offered by
the future concessionaire, in particular not if alternative means are available. That, at any rate, is the
responsibility of the concessionaire: to make Galileo
sufficiently attractive to as many customers as are
necessary to constitute a viable market.
Notes

Concluding Remarks

The above presents, in effect, no more than a rather
succinct overview of the most salient issues at play
in the discussion on intellectual property rights as a
potential revenue-generating tool for Galileo, and in
particular the future private GOC. This reflects on
the overall business case for Galileo; it has become
clear that any final solution as to the extent to
which intellectual property rights be used by the
GOC for generation of revenue within the context
of free availability of OS will indeed depend to a
major extent on the outcome of concession negotiations, to be expected towards the end of 2005
or shortly thereafter.
Whilst making use of the existing measure of legal
protection as surveyed here, differing as it does
amongst types of intellectual property rights as
much as between markets, and despite widespread
harmonisation of European market regulation, the
two negotiating partners still have to thrash out between them how to ensure maximisation of opportunities for the generation of GOC revenues on
a number of counts. Will the GOC be offered sufficient opportunities to control relevant patents?
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